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Ownership or Use? Civilian Property Interests In
International Humanitarian Law
Lea Brilmayer and Geoffrey Chepiga*
This artide argues that ifand when recovery is possible for civilian property illegally destroyed during
war-and there are reasons to believe that it is becoming an ever more realistic possibility-then damages
should reflect not just the replacement value or market value of the items destroyed, but rather the human-
itarian value, or what we refer to as the "civilian use" value. Food, medicine, and dothing should be
compensated at higher levels, and according to a different calculus, than jewelry, radios, or sports equip-
ment even though these items may cost the same to replace. For, particularly with respect to large infra-
structure like grain warehouses or hospitals, international humanitarian law privileges "users" over and
above "owners." This artide first explains the justifications for implementing a "civilian use" approach
to damages, and then sketches a rough mod£1 of how an international court or tribunal might implement
the approach.
"Indeed, there is no surer way of keeping possession than by devasta-
tion. Whoever becomes the master of a city accustomed to freedom, and
does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed himself."1
"Until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless to occupy it, but the
utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their mili-
tary resources ... I can make the march and make Georgia howl."2
I. INTRODUCTION
It is now one hundred years since the Hague Convention of 1907 first
provided for financial liability against states whose armed forces intention-
ally destroy civilian property in war. 3 Similar liability provisions appeared in
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Ethiopia Claims Commission, concerning violations of international humanitarian law during the Ethio-
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1. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 18 (George Bull trans" 2003) (1513),
2, Telegram from William Tecumseh Sherman to Gen, Ulysses S, Grant (OCt. 9, 1864), in SHERMAN'S
CIVIL WAR: SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE OF WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, 1860-1865, at 731 (Brooks D.
Simpson ed., 1999).
3, See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 3, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat,
2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV») ("A belligerent Parry which violates the provi-
sions of [this Convention) shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation, It shall be responsi-
ble for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces,"). The substantive protections for
civilian property are found in article 25 ("The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns,
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the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,4 as well as in the two Additional
Protocols of 1977. ~ The purpose behind such liability has been to deter the
kind of scorched-earth tactics contemplated by Machiavelli and carried out
by General Sherman on his ruthless March to the Sea. Until recently, how-
ever, these provisions have been largely theoretical. Jean Pictet, the "grand-
father" of the Geneva Conventions, declared shortly after their drafting that
"it is not possible, at any rate as the law at present stands, to imagine an
injured party being able to bring an action individually against the State in
whose service the author of the infraction was."6
Jurisdiction is among the many reasons why such liability has been
largely limited to theory.7 Belligerent states, the obvious defendants, are
generally immune to jurisdiction without their consent,S and few states are
willing to consent to the establishment of adjudicatory bodies that would
villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.") and article 28 ("The pillage of a
town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.").
4. An article common to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949 notes that "[nlo High Contracting
Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Parcy of any liability incurred by
itself or by anothet High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to in the preceding article [on
grave breachesl." See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 148, Aug. 12, 1949,6 V.S.T. 3516,75 V.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention}.
5. The First Additional Protocol makes a state's obligation to pay compensation explicit: "A belliger-
ent party which violates the provisions of the said regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be tesponsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces."
Protocol Addi tional ro the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 91, June 8, 1977, 1125 V.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol
I}; see also J. Crook, Is Iraq Entitled to Judicial Due Process?, in THE VNITED NATIONS CoMPENSATION
COMMISSION 77, 87 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995). The Second Protocol follows the First. See Second
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol
I1}.
6. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMEUORATION
OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED foRCES IN THE FIELD 373 (Jean Pictet ed.,
1952).
7. Among the hurdles besides jurisdiction is the fact that established tribunals such as the Interna-
tional Court of Justice ("IC]") are not well-suited to adjudicating claims concerning civilian compensa-
tion because institutionally they ate not well-equipped to entertain mass claims, which is often the form
that Geneva Convention cases take. Ad hoc tribunals such as the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and
the U.N. Compensation Commission have now broken the ice, but these are still more the exception than
the norm. Again, jurisdiction in these tribunals has been consensual. Examples of claims commissions
and tribunals have grown more numerous over time, however, and the advent of the International Crimi-
nal Court may set the stage for a larger number of reparations tribunals.
8. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 156
V.N.T.S. 77. While ICJ jurisdiction is generally consensual, there is also the "optional clause" system
under article 36(2), through which a state can Opt to recognize the jurisdiction of the court as compulsory
in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation. As of 2007, sixty-six nations have filed
declarations recognizing compulsory ICJ jurisdiction as against each other. See Declarations Recognizing
as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, hccp://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/in-
dex.php?pl =5&p2= 1&p3=3 (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). In addition, under article 36(1), a nation may
consent specifically to jurisdiction over a particular category of cases or disputes pursuant to a separare
treaty. Of course, the former type of jurisdiction is grounded ultimately on consent as well-even if the
consent in question is provided at an early point in time.
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hold them liable for what amounts to war crimes.9 Even if jurisdiction in a
suitable tribunal could be established, would-be claimants face the tradi-
tional restriction that only states have rights under international law-indi-
vidual claims, to be cognizable, must be "espoused" by the individual's
home state. lO In effect, then, individuals have been able to recover only with
both the affirmative support of their own state and the acquiescence (reluc-
tant or otherwise) of its opponent.
These hurdles, finally, are giving way. Building on models such as the
Iran-United States Claims TribunaPI and the United Nations Compensation
Commissionl2 ("UNCC"), increasing numbers of international adjudicatory
bodies have been brought into existence, precisely in order to require viola-
tors of international humanitarian law to pay compensation to civilian vic-
tims. The Darfur Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006 envisioned the
establishment of a Compensation Commission that would hear claims
brought by individual Darfurians against the Government of Sudan;13 the
two states of Eritrea and Ethiopia are currently arbitrating claims at the
9. History contains many examples of losing nations forced to submit to adjudicatory processes by
victorious nations, such as Germany through the Treaty of Versailles. Truly impartial commissions have
been very rare. As one historian observes, "the number of post-war claims tribunals that did, in fact, issue
awards benefiting nationals of both States Parties can be counted on two hands." David]. Bederman,
Historic AnalogueJ of the UN Compensation Commission, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMIS.
SION, supra note 5, at 257,258. The handful of mutually remunerative prior tribunals includes the Mixed
Commissions established by the Jay Treaty of 1794 and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
10. The doctrine of "diplomatic protection" or "diplomatic standing" requires a state to espouse the
claims of its nationals in international litigation. See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v.
Eng.), 1924 P.C.!.]. (ser. A) No.2, at 13 (Aug. 30); IAN BROWNliE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBliC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 374 (6th ed. 2003).
11. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was created to help resolve the crisis in relations between
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States arising out of the detention of fifty-two U.S. nationals
at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, which commenced in November 1979, and the subsequent freeze of
Iranian assetS by the United States. See generally CHARLES N. BROWER, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL (998). Our of approximately 4000 total claims filed at the Iran-United States Claims Tribu-
nal, approximately 1500 were filed by individuals. However, only six individual claims have been heard,
and only one of those resulted in an award of compensation. The vast majority of individual claims were
blocked by the Tribunal's evidentiary standard for establishing "constructive wrongful expulsion:'
Charles N. Brower, Lessons of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 15, 19.
12. The UNCC was created by the U.N. Security Council in 1991 to process claims for damage
suffered as a direct result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and'occupation of Kuwait. See generally THE UNITED
NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note 5. Iraq's "consent" was obtained under military du-
ress. The recipients of UNCC awards were the individual victims in Kuwait. In JUSt two years, the
UNCC received over twO million claims made against Iraq by individuals, businesses, NGOs, and na-
tion-stares. Carlos Alzamora, The U.N. Compensation Commission: An Overview, in THE UNITED NATIONS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 3, 5.
13. Darfur Peace Agreement arts. 199-213, May 5, 2006, available at hrcp://africa.berkeley.edu/Su-
dan/DarfurIDPA_ABUJA-5-05-06-withSignatures.pdf. Only one of the major rebel groups signed the
Darfur Peace Agreement, and prospects of establishing a Compensation Commission in the near furure
remain slim. Nevertheless, compensation for Darfurians has played a role in negotiations throughout the
conflict. The U.N. International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur also called for the establishment of a
Compensation Commission. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, ~ 593 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://
www.un.orglNews/dh/sudan/coffi_inq_darfur.pdf.
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Permanent Court of Arbitration for violations of international humanitarian
law committed during their 1998-2000 border war;14 and the International
Criminal Court ("ICC") has adopted procedures for awarding reparations to
civilians. 15 Although it is far toO early to dismiss traditional limitations as
merely history, we must plan for a future in which their relevance is ever
more in doubt.
The path-breaking courts and arbitral bodies charged with overseeing
these experiments in international justice face considerable difficulties in
applying international humanitarian law. 16 The legal instruments at issue-
the 1907 Hague Conventions, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and
the First Additional Protocol of 1977-are pitched at an abstract level and
do not address technical issues such as the specifics of judicial remedies. Nor
does the academic literature fill this void; legal scholars have to this date
been far more concerned with the substantive contours of the laws of war
than the "procedural" or "remedial" problems arising when these norms
serve as the basis for individual claims for compensation. With international
adjudication on the rise, however, such questions cannot be deferred
indefinitely.
14. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission was established pursuant to article 5 of the Algiers
Peace Agreement signed on December 12, 2000, berween Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Commission is to
"decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the
other [that} ... result from violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, or other violations of international law." Agreement Between the Governments of the State
of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Eri.-Ethi., Dec. 12, 2000, 2138 V.N.T.S.
94, available at http://server.ni jmedia.nl/pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Algiers%20Agreement(2).pdf.
15. Pursuant to arcicle 75 of the Rome Statute, "[t]he Court shall establish principles relating to
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation." Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Courc arc. 75, July 17, 1998,2187 V.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome
Statute). The ICC has not as yet made any reparations awards, but it has established procedures to do so
under both its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the Regulations of the Assembly of States Parcies.
See Pablo de Greiff & Marieke Wierda, The Trust Fund for Victims of the International Criminal Court:
Between Possibilities and Constraints, in OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND
SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 225 (K. De Feyter et aI. eds., 2006); see also Adrian Di Gio-
vanni, The Prosp«t of ICC Reparatiom in the Case Concerning Northern Uganda: On a Collision Course with
Incoherence? 2 J. INT'L 1. & INT'L REL. 25 (2006) (arguing that the ICC should move slowly and deliber-
ately in awarding reparations to ensure that it does so equitably and with due regard to the larger goals of
transitional justice). Importantly, the mechanisms of the ICC can be set in motion without any prior
consent of the target state beyond its initial application for membership in the Vnited Nations. See Rome
Statute, supra, arc. 13; see also Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC jurisdiction over Non-Signatory Nationals, 33
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 1. 1 (2000).
16. The terms "international humanitarian law" and "law of war" or 'jus in bello" are largely inter-
changeable. Following common usage, we generally use "law of war" to refer to pre-1949 law and
"international humanitarian law" for post-1949 law. See generally Theodor Meron, The Humanization of
Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L 1. 239 (2000); Robert Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention,
106 MICH. 1. REV. 443, 445 (2007) ("The term international humanitarian law ("IHL"), in contrast to
older appellarions such as rhe law of armed conflict or the law of war, connotes a shift .... Broadly
speaking, this shifr has been from a nerwork of customary law and treaties--enforced by a variety of
political dynamics that obrain berween the professional armies of nation-states, including reciprocity,
reputation, and military discipline wirhin a hierarchical command structure-to an increasing reliance
on norms of human dignity and individual righrs that IHL shares with and derives in part from interna-
tional human rights law. ").
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One fundamental question-the focus of this Article-concerns the
unique conception of "property" embodied in international humanitarian
law. Civilian property protections under international humanitarian law are
not like property protections elsewhere in international law. Generally,
property protections in other areas of international law (such as norms
prohibiting expropriation of property without compensation) are closely
analogous to domestic property regimes. Such regimes privilege ownership
and its corollary, the right to exclude;17 they view property primarily as an
end in itself, such that the contours of property rights rarely, if ever, change
based on the substance of the property in question.
International humanitarian law, on the other hand, is driven by a concep-
tion of property that is more instrumental, and values property in direct
proportion to its role in assuring the survival of civilians. IS Thus, interna-
tional humanitarian law distinguishes ownership of property from use of prop~
erty, largely disregarding the ownership interests that figure centrally in
times of peace, but protecting users' interests. We argue, therefore, that
awarding damages like a domestic court-exclusively on the basis of injury
to owners-would misalign the remedy and the substantive legal protec"
tion. We suggest instead that international adjudicatory bodies should take
a "use value" approach to compensation for illegally destroyed civilian prop-·
erty. We refer to this approach as the "civilian-use model."
This Article opens in Part II with a historical survey of the development
of the protections for civilian property in international humanitarian law.
The language and drafting history of the substantive texts makes it evident
that "civilian-use value" is the central element motivating protection of
property. Notable in this regard are the First Additional Protocol's concept
of "civilian objects"-these are defined in terms of civilian use-and its
heightened protection of civilian objects that are "indispensable to the sur-
vival of the civilian population."19
Part III examines how the civilian-use model would function in practice;
It begins with the theoretical issue of when and why to apply the model,
and then turns to practical questions of how it would operate. We suggest
that when such items as hospitals, water wells, or grain silos are deliberately
17. See ].E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997) ("Thus at a theotetical level we
understand the right to property equally as a right of exclusion or a right of use, since they are opposite
sides of the same coin. ").
18. As the U.S. delegate to Geneva said, the Geneva Conventions protect civilian property "in order
to spare civilian populations the sufferings which might result ftom the destruction of their houses,
clothes, foodstuffs and the means of earning their living." 2i).. FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CON-
FERENCE CONVENED BY THE SWISS FEDERAL COUNCIL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CON-
VENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS AND HELD AT GENEVA FROM APRIL 21ST TO AUGUST
12TH, 1949, at 649 (2004) [hereinafter 2A FINAL RECORD).
19. See infra Patt II.C (discussing Protocol I, att. 54, which states that "[i)t is ptohibited ro arrack,
destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as
foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installa-
tions and supplies and irrigation works").
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destroyed, the model should be applied by awarding a relatively small fixed
sum to every individual in a given catchment area. This approach minimizes
the cost to a tribunal of measuring civilian reliance, and provides a verifia-
ble, objective measure that can be tailored to any situation.
Part IV situates the civilian-use model within the current international
law of remedies. Drawing the connection between civilian-use damages and
consequential damages, we show that neither the requirement of proximate
cause nor the prohibitions on double recovery and punitive damages are vio-
lated by applying the model.
We conclude that basing recovery at least in part on "civilian-use value"
is the best way to carry forward the principles underlying international hu-
manitarian law. A compensation scheme that recognizes the role of property
in assuring civilian survival is more in tune with the purposes of the Geneva
Conventions, and may also better deter scorched-earth military campaigns
going forward.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PROPERTY
International humanitarian law has protected civilian property for almost
as long-and for much the same reasons-as it has protected the civilian
person. The 1907 Hague Conventions, the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, and the 1977 Additional Protocol I were designed to protect civilians
against scorched-earth tactics by forbidding the intentional destruction of
items essential for their survival, such as foodstuffs, water, and livestock.2o
The practical necessity for such protection, unfortunately, is clear.
Scorched-earth tactics have occupied a central, if ignominious, place in
the history of warfare. Writing in 1513, Machiavelli was neither the first
nor the last to expound the tactical advantages to be gained from destroying
the sustenance of a civilian population. 21 General Sherman saw such attacks
as the way to end the Civil War. Hitler believed that attacking civilians
would bring England to its knees. 22 Nor are such strategies a thing of the
past: in the last few years, armies have systematically attacked civilian hospi-
20. Attacks against civilians and theit property are prohibited by articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention and by article 52 of Protocol I. See generally infra Part II. Deliberate attacks on
civilians and civilian objects are further prohibited by other sources of international humanitarian law,
notably the Hague Convention (IV), supra note 3, art. 23(g), and the Rome Statute, supra note IS, arc.
8(2)(b)(ii). See also Prosecuror v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-l6, Judgment, ~ 521 (Jan. 14,2000) ("The
protection of civilians in time of armed conflict ... is the bedrock of modern humanitarian law. ").
21. MACHIAVELLI, supra note I.
22. At the start of the Blitz, the Nazi bombing of London that killed approximately 43,000 British
civilians, Hitler issued a directive to the Luftwaffe ro carry out "distuptive attacks on the population ...
by day and night." Klaus A. Maier, The Operational Air War until the Battle ofBritain, in 2 GERMANY AND
THE SECOND WORLD WAR: GERMANY'S INITIAL CONQUESTS IN EUROPE 327, 387 (Militiirgeschichtliches
ed., Dean S. McMurray & Ewald Osers crans., 1991).
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tals in the former Yugoslavia,23 burned civilian grain stores in Darfur,24 and
razed villages in the Democratic Republic of Congo.25 Debate continues to-
day over the U.S. military's policy of knocking out an enemy's electrical grid
as its first act of war. U.S. officials have openly acknowledged that one rea-
son the United Scates targets enemy electrical grids is to achieve "second-
order" effects such as lowering civilian morale. 26
The historical development of this area of law-the best interpretive
guide at hand27-reveals that the central concern of those who drafted the
relevant conventions was not protecting the ownership rights of civilians,
but rather the use value of that property to the population at large. 28 The
trend has been apparent virtually since the inception of the laws of war. As
we will show, starting at the beginning of the last century, humanitarian
law activists focused increasingly on the protection of civilian property as a
means for the protection of civilians. The principle is now firmly embedded
in modern international humanitarian law.
A. Civilian Property Protection Prior to the Second World War
Prior to the twentieth century, international custom and the purported
"laws of war" offered scant protections for civilians, and even fewer for their
property. In medieval Europe, civilian property was seen as a significant
23. American journalist Roy Gutman, in Croatia at the time, has written of a "parrern whereby
(Croatian] hospirals were targeted" by the Setbian Army. See Roy Gutman, Spotlight on Violations of
International Humanitarian Law: The Role of the Media, 325 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 619, 623
(998), available at hrrp:llwww.ictc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/html/57)P)F ("Years latet, I learned that
an ICRC delegate had concluded at the time that the hospital at Vinkovci was a 'perfect' example of a
violation of the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, it was only one hospital under constant arrack. ICRC
staff identified Karlovac and Osijek as others. The ICRC of coutse could not provide a complete account
for arrack on the hospital in Vukovar, which took, according to Croatian information, hundreds of shells
and twO 500-pound gravity bombs. When that did nor destroy the hospital, after Serbs captured the
town they carred off all the survivors and shot them. ").
24. See, e.g., Lydia Polgreen, Scorched Earth Strategy Returns to Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at AI;
Amnesty Int'l, Sudan Government's Solution: janjawid Unleashed in Darfur, AI Index AFR 54/078/2006
(Nov. 24, 2006), available at hrrp://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR540782006ENGLISH/$Filel
AFR5407806.pdf.
25. See, e.g., Simon Robinson & Vivienne Walt, The Deadliest War in the World, TIME, June 5, 2006, at
38.
26. See). W. Crawford III, The Law of Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electric Power
Systems, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 101, 101 (997) ("Proponents (of attacking electrical grids] assert
that attacking electricity results in particularly damaging 'second order' impacts on civilian morale,
political leadership, military forces, and materiel production.").
27. On the use of historical development and drafters' intent as an intefl5retive guide in case of a gap
or ambiguity in the law, see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 V.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides, "[a] treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." [d. art. 31. Article 32 elaborates,
"{r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the appli-
cation of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to arricle 31
leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure." [d. arr. 32.
28. See infra Pares 11.8, II.C.
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source of booty, within the reach of soldiers who may otherwise have had no
regular source of pay.29 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, civilian
property was requisitioned with impunity. 3D During the nineteenth century,
army field manuals such as Lieber's Code, which was used as rules of engage-
ment by the North during the American Civil War, provided that seizing
civilian property was not allowed bur created a large exception for military
necessity.31 Not only was the determination of "military necessity" left in
the hands of military commanders themselves, but the exception was so
broad as to swallow the rule-military necessity "allow[ed} of all destruc-
tion of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel,
or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life
from the enemy."32
It was not until the first half of the twentieth century that international
law focused squarely on the protection of civilians and their property. The
first international legal protections for civilians and their property were the
regulations promulgated in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. For
the most part, these Conventions regulated how hostile armies could attack
each other (what kinds of bullets may be used, how spies were to be treated,
and so forth). Bur in delineating rules of engagement, they also provided
some protections for civilians. For instance, article 23(g) forbids armies to
"destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. "33 The law here is similar
to Lieber's Code in giving the military discretion, bur the language is more
stringent, requiring "imperative" necessity. Similarly, article 46 addresses
private property: "Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and pri-
vate property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be
respected. Private property cannot be confiscated. "34 This article was also
largely borrowed from Lieber's Code and encapsulated best practices of the
nineteenth century.
Yet while these protections represented an important step down the path
that eventually led to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, they were too thin
29. See generally M.H. KEEN, THE LAws OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES (2d ed. 1993).
30. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAWS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
LAw OF WAR IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 121-23(993). Vitoria, the famous Spanish just-war theorist,
argued that victorious armies earned the right to all property in the vanquished state: "All moveables
vest in the seizor by the law of nations [ius gentium}, even if in amount they exceed what will compensate
for damages sustained." FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE lURE BELU RELECTIONES 184 (Ernest
Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans., William S. Hein Co. 1995) (917).
31. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GoVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
FIELD (863), reprinted in LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 48 (Richard Shelly Hartigan ed., 1983).
32. [d. ("Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of
other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable ... it allows of all destruction of property,
and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of
sustenance or means of life from the enemy.").
33. Hague Convention (IV), supra note 3, art. 23(g).
34. [d. art. 46.
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and general to be of real value during war. The coming of "total war"3~ and
the sufferings of civilians during World War I belied the idea that a bellig-
erent's honor was enough to protect civilians, or that it could be left up to
the invading army to decide when destroying or seizing enemy property
could be condoned by military necessity.
In the years following World War I, the international community sought
to enhance the Hague Convention's protections for civilians and their prop-
erty. However, progress in drafting new conventions was slow. In 1934, the
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") finally completed its
Tokyo Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilians, bur the Draft was
not ratified by the time World War II erupted in 1939.36 From the first
days of World War II, the ICRC proposed that belligerents pur the protec-
tions of the Tokyo Draft into effect, but the proposal was rejected by all
sides to the conflicrY
The Second World War caused intense civilian suffering on an unprece-
dented scale, inside Nazi concentration camps, during the firebombing of
Dresden, and at the Rape of Nanking, to mention only a few examples. The
establishment of new conventions, including a convention specifically de-
signed to protect civilians was felt to be "an imperative necessity."38 In the
summer of 1946, the ICRC called a preliminary conference. In 1947, the
Draft Conventions were debated and amended by a Conference of Govern-
ment Experts39 and then approved by the Seventeenth International Confer-
ence of the Red Cross at Stockholm in 1948.40 A diplomatic conference was
convened in Geneva, and the Four Geneva Conventions were ratified in the
late summer of 1949.
B. Geneva IV and the Protection of Civilian Use
The first three Geneva Conventions update the laws of war as applied to
combatants' conduct toward one another. The Fourth Geneva Convention
(Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War) became the first
international instrument designed specifically to protect civilians. It in-
cludes 159 articles and is divided into four parts.41
35. See, e.g., GERMAN HIST. INST., ANTICIPATING TOTAL WAR: THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN EXPER.
IENCES, 1871-1914 (M.F. Boemeke, R. Chickering & S. Forster eds., 1999).




39. See Josef L. Kunz, The Chaotic StatUJ of the LaWJ of War and the Urgent NeceJJity fur Their ReviJion, in
HUMANITARIAN LAW 81, 102 (Judirh Gardman ed., 1999).
40. [d.
41. The firsr part deals with the general protection of civilian populations against the effecrs of war;
rhe second part concerns individual righrs againsr rorrure and execution wirhout due process; rhe third
part lays our rules concerning enemy or alien civilians in belligerent countries; and the fourrh parr
concerns occupied territories.
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Property protections appear in several different places in the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention. Article 18 prohibits attack at any time against civilian
hospitals or medical care facilities. Article 33 establishes a general prohibi-
tion on "pillage,"42 bur leaves intact a belligerent's right to seize or requisi-
tion property.43 In the case of an occupation by enemy forces, the
Convention creates a hierarchy of property protections. Under article 55,
foodstuffs or medical supplies may not be requisitioned, and an occupying
power must ensure an adequate supply of these items.44 All other property,
under article 53, is simply protected from being destroyed.45 In cases where
civilians are placed in internment camps, occupying powers may not take
their possession without giving detailed receipts.46
Broadly speaking, these articles were designed to safeguard property be-
cause property was seen as essential to civilian welfare, and in particular to
mitigating suffering. The U.S. delegate at Geneva made the point concisely.
He said that the Fourth Geneva Convention needed to protect property "in
order to spare civilian populations the sufferings which might result from
the destruction of their houses, clothes, foodstuffs and the means of earning
their living, as had happened at Oradour and Lidice."47 As further explained
in the Official Commentary, "[t}he purpose of this Convention is to protect
human beings, bur it also contains certain provisions concerning property,
designed to spare people the suffering resulting from the destruction of their
real and personal property (houses, deeds, bonds, etc., furniture, clothing,
provisions, tools, etc.)."48 Indeed, whenever property was debated and dis-
cussed in the various conferences that led up to the ratification of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, it was consistently valued for its importance in prevent-
ing civilian suffering.
An important example is the heightened protection that the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention provides to civilian hospitals. The drafters of the Fourth
Geneva Convention went to great lengths to ensure that civilian hospitals
42. Fourth Geneva Convention, Jupya note 4, att. 33. The Convention uses "pillage" broadly: "This
prohibition is general in scope. It concerns not only pillage through individual acts withour the consent
of the military authorities, but also organized pillage, the effects of which are recounted in the histories
of former wars, when the boory allocated to each soldier was considered as part of his pay." INT'L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTEcrION OF CIVIL-
IAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 226-27 Oean S. Pieret ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans.,
1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY IV).
43. Article 33 "guarantees all types of property, whether they belong to private persons or to Commu-
nities or the State. On the other hand, it leaves intact the right of requisition or seizure." See Fourth
Geneva Convention, Jupra note 4, art. 33.
44. ld. art. 55 ("To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty
of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the neces-
sary foodstuffs, medical stores and Other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are
inadequate. ").
45. ld art. 53.
46. ld. art. 97.
47. 2A FINAL RECORD, Jupra note 18, at 649. Oradour-sur-Glane (France) and Lidice (Czechoslovakia)
were sites of Nazi massacres of civilians during World War II.
48. COMMENTARY IV, Jupra note 42, at 226.
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were protected from attack. Prior protections had been slim: the Hague
Conventions of 1907 had only urged armies to take reasonable steps to avoid
shelling hospitals,49 and their predecessors, the earliest Geneva Conventions
of 1864, had protected military hospitals but not civilian ones. 50 As a result,
prior to 1949, some armies had been in the practice of "militarizing" civil-
ian hospitals, that is, bringing wounded soldiers into civilian hospitals in
hopes of qualifying the civilian hospitals as "military" and therefore pro-
tected. 51 However, article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention protects ci-
vilian hospitals, and provides more protection to civilian hospitals than to
any other type of property. The Official Commentary emphasized that civil-
ian hospitals should be able to pursue their work under certain conditions
and be protected against pillage, that patients undergoing treatment should
be protected against expulsion, and that staffs and equipment should receive
special privileges. 52 Hospitals receive special privileges because, more than
any other infrastructure, their destruction leads in turn to grave civilian
harm. Not only are the patients inside affected,B but when hospitals are
destroyed, no one else in the community can receive care either.
1. Ideas of "Ownership"
In contrast to the "use value" of property, ideas of "ownership" or "the
right to exclude" received scant attention in either the drafting debates or in
the final provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. For example, article
33 generally prohibits "pillage," but stops short of forbidding an army from
requisitioning or seizing civilian property.54 Similarly, during an occupa-
tion, article 53 prohibits the destruction of civilian property, but not its requi-
sition or seizure. 55 Such a distinction between what may not be requisitioned
and what may not be destroyed would not have been necessary if ownership
value was centrally important, because from an aggrieved civilian's perspec-
tive, the seizure, requisition, or destruction of their personal property has
49. Hague Convention (IV), supra note 3, art. 27 ("In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps
must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charirable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided
they are not being used at the time for military purposes.").
50. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field arts.
1-2, Aug. 22, 1864,22 Stat. 940, T.S. 377.
51. COMMENTARY IV, supra note 42, at 141.
52. [d. at 142-43.
53. [d. at 143 ("The main purpose of article 18 is to protect civilian hospitals; by that very faCt it
protects also the wounded, sick, infirm and maternity cases under treatment in those hospitals.").
54. [d. at 227, ~ 30).
55. See id. at 301 ("It should be noted that the prohibition only refers to 'destruction.' Under interna-
tional law the occupying authorities have a recognized right, under certain circumstances, to dispose of
property within the occupied territory-namely the right to requisition private property, the right to
confiscate any movable property belonging to the State which may be used for military operarions and
the right to administer and enjoy the use of real property belonging to the occupied State.").
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the same effect. 56 Had the drafters been concerned with protecting rights of
ownership, they surely could have found stronger ways to state these
prohibitions.
Indeed, one of the only times the drafters protect the right to exclude is
article 55, which prohibits an occupying power from destroying or seizing
food and medicine belonging to civilians.57 Thus, in an occupation, while all
other objects are only protected from destruction, food and medicine can be
neither destroyed nor seized. The possessory right is recognized here,
uniquely, because food and medicine contribure so directly to survival.
One of the only other times the Fourth Geneva Convention even addresses
the concept of individual ownership is in article 97, which protects personal
belongings in the possession of civilian internees. When internment of civil-
ians is permitted, the occupying power must allow internees to maintain
their personal effects, unless it gives them receipts for the objects confis-
cated: "Internees shall be permitted to retain articles of personal use. Mon-
ies, cheques, bonds, etc., and valuables in their possession may not be taken
from them except in accordance with established procedure. Detailed re-
ceipts shall be given therefor."58 This recognition of individual ownership is
wholly appropriate in the context of internment, because internment mirrors
conditions of peacetime more than war. Internment presupposes that the
occupying power has ensured plenary authority over the territory, and is
functioning as a de facto government.59 But even within this more tradi-
tional framework of individual ownership, "civilian use" plays a crucial role.
As the Commentary to article 97 clarifies, "articles of personal use," which
may never be confiscated, refers to necessities: "[C}lothes, linen, blankets
and toilet requisites, but also books, perhaps a portable typewriter, medical
supplies or anything, speaking generally, which is used in daily life."60 On
the other hand, those items that the occupying power may requisition, if it
gives receipts for them, are those that will not contribute to survival in an
internment camp-money, cheques, bonds, family heirlooms. Thus, even
though individual ownership rights are recognized in the context of intern-
56. Fourth Geneva Convenrion, supra note 4, att. 55. Article 53's citcuitous phrasing confitms this
infetence. Article 53 prohibits the destruction of propetty owned by individuals Ot by any othet entity in
the following tetms: "Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging
individually or collectively ro private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social
or cooperative organizations, is prohibited." [d. art. 53. The list of possible owners of property is so broad
as to be virtually meaningless. The real inrenr here seems to be to distinguish military and civilian
objects, not to protect ownership.
57. [d. art. 55 ("The Occupying Power may not requisition foodstuffs, articles or medical supplies
available in the occupied territory, except for use by the occupation forces and administration personnel,
and then only if the requiremenrs of the civilian population have been taken inro account. ").
58. [d. art. 97.
59. Although inrernmenr of civilians often occurs during a war, such as the inrernmenr of Japanese
Americans during World War II, alm~st by definition there are no active hostilities inside inrernmenr
camps.
60. [d. art. 97, 11 1.
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ment camps, the overall property regime prioritizes use value over and above
ownership rights.
Although our focus here is civilian property, we note that a virtually
identical regime applies to the property of prisoners of war. Article 18 of the
Third Geneva Convention (Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War),
holds that POWs' money may be confiscated, if a receipt is given, but their
captors may not confiscate any items of personal use: "All effects and articles
of personal use . . . shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war . . . .
Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall likewise remain in
their possession."61 The provision goes even further, as it allows soldiers to
retain certain military equipment that is intended to protect them:
"[L}ikewise their metal helmets and gas masks and like articles issued for
personal protection [shall remain in their possession} ... even if such effects
and articles belong to their regulation military equipment."62 POWs may
keep whatever personal effects they own, or even military equipment, pro-
vided it contributes to their survival, bur they may be forced to relinquish
anything else, such as money. Survival and safety are protected, whereas
possessory interests of non-essential items are subordinated.
2. Article 53
The tension between ownership interests and civilian-use value came to a
head in the drafting of article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which,
as discussed above, contains a blanket protection of civilian property in the
context of an occupation by enemy forces. The initial "Stockholm version"
of article 53 built on article 43 of the Hague Convention of 1907 and sim-
ply protected private property from attack.63 Under the Hague Convention
of 1907, as well as many domestic laws and army field manuals like Lieber's
Code, civilian property could be destroyed only if required by military ne-
cessity, bur property owned by the state could be confiscated, seized, or
destroyed at will. This protection reflected customary international law,
which at the time had long been more solicitous of private property than
state-owned or public property.
At the diplomatic conference in Geneva, the Soviet Union challenged the
Stockholm draft as too narrow in scope to prevent civilian suffering. The
Soviet delegate argued to the subcommittee in charge of drafting the Fourth
Geneva Convention that civilians in socialist countries relied on state-owned
property for sustenance. The Soviet delegate said, "[T}he destruction of
61. Geneva Convention Relative to the Tteatment of Ptisoners of Wat art. 18, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
V.S.T. 3116,75 V.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention).
62. Id.
63. I FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPWMATIC CONFERENCE CONVENED BY THE SWISS FEDERAL COUNCIL
FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS AND
HELD AT GENEVA FROM APRIL 21ST TO AUGUST 12TH, 1949, at 118 (2004) ("Measures of reptisal
against protected persons or their property are prohibited.").
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[State} property affected not only the interests of the State but also those of
individuals. "64 The delegate from China supported the Soviet proposal, since
it "provided for the prohibition of destruction of all categories of property,"
and "the Article should be worded in such a way as to ensure the alleviation
of the sufferings of war victims."65 To protect civilians, both private and
government property would have to be protected.
The United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom objected. They
claimed that the Soviet proposal would over-extend the protection and that
there was no basis in existing international law for protecting property
owned by a defeated state. These Western countries felt it important to
allow victorious armies to take government property in order to dismantle
their military capability, and to payoff their own debts.
Facing this impasse, the delegate from Monaco offered a compromise so-
lution. Under Monaco's proposal, the protection of property would extend to
any items "intended solely" for use by individuals and not by the govern-
ment, no matter who actually owned the property.66 The proposal was ac-
ceptable to all and eventually became article 53. The Monaco compromise
explains the article's final, circuitous phrasing on ownership: "Any destruc-
tion by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individ-
ually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public
authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited ...."67
The circuitous phrasing makes the article applicable any time the destruc-
tion of property threatens to cause civilian suffering, regardless of who or
what owns the property.68
Thus, the Fourth Geneva Convention drew a link between protecting
property and preventing suffering, and by and large neglected traditional,
perhaps more "Western," concepts of ownership. Property was valued in
relation to its humanitarian value, with food and medicine receiving the
most protection. This yardstick was well understood by the JCRC, the draft-
ing states, and the larger international legal community. As Lauterpacht
would later write,
We shall urterly fail to understand the true character of the law of war
unless we realize that its purpose is almost entirely humanitarian in the
literal sense of the word, namely to prevent or mitigate suffering ....
64. 2A FINAL RECORD, supra note 18, at 649.
65. ld. at 651.
66. ld. at 650.
67. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 53.
68. Thereby the drafting states disregarded the customary international law distinction between pti-
vate and public property. As the Commentary on article 53 summarizes: "It must be agteed, howevet,
that this extension {to public ptoperty} gives the provision a character which does not altogether fit in
with the general scope of the Convention." COMMENTARY IV, supra note 42, art. 53.
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[The Geneva Conventions protect property} for property is not merely
an economic asset; it may be a means of livelihood.69
The Fourth Geneva Convention protects civilians by protecting their prop-
erty, but does not do so along the lines of traditional property rights
through protecting ownership.
C. The Additional Protocol's Protection of "Civilian Objects"
Two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions were drafted be-
tween 1974 and 1977; their purpose was to update the Conventions and fix
the gaps and imperfections that had been exposed in the intervening yearsJo
Protocol I applies to international armed conflicts,71 and Protocol II applies
to non-international armed conflicts.72 These exemplify and expand on the
Fourth Geneva Convention's valuation of property according to its role in
mitigating civilian suffering.
Protocol I makes sweeping additions to the Geneva Conventions' civilian
property protections. Article 52 prohibits attacks against "civilian objects"
at all periods of an international armed conflict, not just during an occupa-
tionJ3 Almost as revolutionary, it extends the Geneva Conventions' defini-
tion of "civilian objects" to include all objects that are not in use by the
militaryJ4 The article therefore protects all objects that are in use by civil-
ians, regardless of who owns them.
This definition of "civilian objects" solves the dilemma posed by Soviet
delegates at Geneva-that the public-private distinction was outmoded and
did not reflect the core concern of preventing civilian suffering. The drafters
of the Fourth Geneva Convention had accepted the Soviet point but had
struggled with how to separate military or government targets from civilian
ones on the basis of ownership. By contrast, the drafters of Protocol I dis-
carded the concept of "ownership" altogether, substituting "civilian use" as
the criterion for protection. This switch from ownership to use is crucial not
69. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem 0/ the Revision 0/ the Law 0/ War, in HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra
note 39, at 107, 110.
70. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno
Zimmermann eds., 1987), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihJ.nsf/COM/470-750069?OpenDocument
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOLS). The Swiss government convened the Diplomatic Conference
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Con-
flicts. The Conference met in Geneva in four sessions, from 1974 to 1977, and produced the tWO
Protocols.
71. Prorocol I, supra note 5. The United States-along with Iran, Morocco, Pakistan, and the Philip-
pines-has not ratified Protocol 1.
72. Protocol II, supra note 5.
73. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 52 ("Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of
reprisals. ").
74. [d. ("In so fat as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or
partial destruerion, capture or neutralization, in the circumsrances ruling at the time, offers a definire
military advantage.")
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only in its own right, but also because it has been followed by all subsequent
treaties and conventions in international humanitarian law,75 including the
Rome Statute,76 and by the military manuals of an overwhelming number of
states.77
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, Protocol I creates a separate,
heightened category of protection for objects that are "indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population."78 Article 54 of Prorocol I prohibits any
action at any time whatsoever against these objects:
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects in-
dispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food-
stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops,
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation
works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance
value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the
motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move
away, or for any other motiveJ9
The drafters' intent was not to reduce protection for other sorts of property,
but, "in the case of indispensable objects ... to increase the degree of protec-
tion. "80 Thus, the article forbids not only the destruction of such objects but
also "render[ing} useless" or "remov[ing}" them. The addition of these two
verbs "cover[s} all possibilities, including pollution, by chemical or other
agents, of water reservoirs, or destruction of crops by defoliants." The term
"indispensable objects" was intended to be "interpreted in the widest sense,
in order to cover the ... needs of populations in all geographic areas. "81 The
enumerated list is not exhaustive-"the words 'such as' show that the list of
75. See, e.g., Convention on Prohibirions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminare Effects, Amended Proto-
col II art. 3(7), May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1206 ("It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct {mines,
booby-traps and other devices], either in offence, defence, or by way of reprisals, against ... civilian
objects.").
76. Rome Statute, supra nore 15, art. 8(2)(b)(ii) ("U]ntentionally directing attacks against civilian
objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives" constitutes a war ctime in international armed
conflicts.).
77. See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. II: PRACTICE, PART 1 916-18 Oean-Marie Henckaerts
8< Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (claiming that the military manuals of Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Benin, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Germany, Italy, Kenya, Leba-
non, Madagascar, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, Togo, the United King-
dom and the United States all prohibit attacks against civilian objects).
78. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 54. Protocol I, art. 69 uses similar language in the context of occupa-
tions, requiring an occupying power to "ensure the provision of clothing, bedding, means of shelter,
other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population of the occupied territory ...." The
Commentary to Article 54 notes that "essential" in article 54 and "indispensable" in article 69 should
be given the same meaning. See CoMMENTARY ON PROTOCOLS, supra note 70, at 652-53.
79. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 54
80. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GE.
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12, 1949, at 62 (973) {hereinafter COMMENTARY; DRAFT ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS] (emphasis added).
81. COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOLS, supra note 70, at 655.
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protected objects is merely illustrative. An exhaustive list could have led to
omissions or an arbitrary selection. "82
These "indispensable objects" are clearly protected because they are es-
sential to the well-being of the civilian population. Indeed, article 54 specif-
ically identifies the relevant actions as destruction or removal "for the
specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian
population or to the adverse Party,"83 thus underscoring that the protected
interest is civilian use and not traditional property rights of owners.
Because Protocol I already protected all civilian objects in article 52, arti-
cle 54's separate recognition of heightened protection for indispensable ob-
jects might at first appear superfluous. However, the need for additional
protection of indispensable objects is clear once the differences between arti-
cle 52 and article 54 are taken into account. Article 54's heightened protec-
tion for indispensable objects was designed to emphasize that certain types
of property can never be attacked under any circumstances. Article 52's defi-
nition of "civilian objects" as all "non-military objectives" is insufficient for
this purpose because it leaves room for a belligerent to argue that the prop-
erty that it destroyed had at least some military value.84 Article 54 deflects
any such argument by creating a purely civilian safe harbor, a set of objects
that can never be defined as "military" or attacked no matter the
circumstances.
The drafting history confirms this inference. The term "indispensable ob-
jects" traces back to the first 1973 draft that the ICRC submitted to the
Diplomatic Conference. The ICRC believed that the purposes of its pro-
posed article were to safeguard civilians and to prevent mass civilian flight.
According to the 1973 ICRC Commentary, "[t}he aim of this provision
emerges at the end of the first sentence: it is to ensure the civilian popula-
tion's survival and avoid the creation of the movements of refugees. "85 Thus,
indispensable objects were first singled out because as long as civilians had
access to them, they would not have to flee.
Article 54's distinctive importance is revealed by the way that its protec-
tions were awkwardly forced into Protocol II, which applies only to non-
international conflicts. Protocol II contains no general protections for civil-
ian property because the drafting states believed they had no authority to
arrange or protect property rights inside a sovereign state. Nonetheless, the
drafting states included a prohibition on attacking or removing indispensa-
ble objects: article 14 of Protocol II borrows the language of article 54 of
82. [d.
83. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 54.
84. See generally INT'L COMM. OP THE RED CROSS, CONPERENCE OP GoVERNMENT EXPERTS ON REAP.
PIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OP INTERNATIONAL HUMANITA~IANLAW ApPLICABLE IN ARMED CON.
PLICTS: REPORT ON THE WORK OP THE CONPERENCE (972).
85. See COMMENTARY: DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 80, at 62.
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Protocol I with the result that even though civilian property in general is
not protected, indispensable objects are.86
Thus, the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I protect property to
the extent it serves as a prophylactic between civilians and suffering. These
conventions attempt to ensure that as many civilians as possible have access
to foodstuffs, water wells, and hospitals. The rest of this Article contends
that international courts or tribunals that award damages for the destruction
of civilian property should recognize these purposes and calculate damages
accordingly.
III. CONTOURS OF A CIVILIAN-USE MODEL
Given that the relevant conventions and customary law are unambiguous
in holding that property used only for civilian purposes cannot be subject to
attack,87 we rurn our attention to the question of how damages should be
measured.
We contend that understanding the property protections of the Geneva
Conventions as instrumental to the protection of civilian users, rather than
as protection for the rights of owners, reorients the damages calculation to-
ward determining the loss inflicted on these users, rather than merely deter-
mining the amount it would take to repair or replace the property in
question. In this way, international humanitarian law's property protections
in times of war are centrally different from property protection in times of
peace, whether grounded in domestic or international law.
This Part addresses first when, then why, and finally how damages for the
destruction of civilian property during war should reflect the amount of
harm done to civilian users.
A. Distinguishing Property Expropriation in Times of Peace from Deliberate
Destruction in Timej of War
The fact that international humanitarian law protects the value of prop-
erty to civilian users rather than owners makes it exceptional. Peacetime
property protections, in contrast, are largely addressed to the interests of
owners. This is true whether the peacetime property protection is found in
international or domestic law; in both cases, property protections are largely
designed to compensate the owner for the market value lost due to the un-
lawful expropriation or taking.
86. ProrocollI, supra nore 5, arr. 14 ("Ir is ... prohibired co arrack, desrroy, remove or render useless,
for rhar purpose, objecrs indispensable ro rhe survival of rhe civilian popularion, such as foodsruffs,
agriculrural areas for rhe producrion of foodsruffs, crops, livesrock, drinking warer insrallarion and sup-
plies and irrigarion works. ").
87. See Hague Convenrion (IV), supra nore 3.
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A clear example of the conceptual similarity between domestic and inter-
national peacetime property protections is the prohibition on expropriation
of property without compensation. International expropriation law is essen-
tially an extension of domestic property protection into the transnational
context. The jurisprudence of expropriation remedies, which is relatively
well-developed, limits compensation to the loss suffered by the owner, who
is assumed to be the sole interested party.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law makes this clear. Sec-
tion 712 of the Restatement provides that "[a} state is responsible under
international law for injury resulting from: a taking by the state of the prop-
erty of a national of another state that (a) is not for a public purpose, or (b) is
discriminatory, or (c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensa-
tion."ss The prohibition protects only those with proper title to goods or to
real property. The commentary explains that the section applies any time
that title is threatened, either through "avowed expropriations in which the
government formally takes title to property," or when "other actions of the
government ... have the effect of 'taking' the property, in whole or in large
part, ourright or in stages ('creeping expropriation')."s9 The appropriate
damages in such a case should be what they would be in a domestic case,
equal to "the full value of the property, usually 'fair market value' where
that can be determined ... [or the} 'going concern value,' if any."90
In this area of international law, analogy to domestic property regimes is
expressly intended and perfectly appropriate. Expropriation by a foreign
state of alien property typically will not affect civilian users of that property
because in most cases it is just a change in ownership. For example, a for-
eign-owned granary or hospital, if expropriated, does not lose its value to the
local population simply because ownership has been transferred to the local
population's own government. Moreover, in times of relative peace, interna-
tional law need not presume the conditions of extreme scarcity that exist in
times of war. Even if the expropriation of a foreign-owned granary caused
hardship to a local population, in most cases, in times of peace, the popula-
tion would have access to some other sources of food. So long as market
value is paid to the owners, the property can be replaced or repaired. There-
fore, there are no issues with protecting users of expropriated property; only
in the most unusual cases would civilian use be seriously implicated.
By contrast, the property protections in international humanitarian law
are designed primarily to deal with cases where an unlawful attack on civil-
ian property involves destruction, rendering useless, etc., as opposed to sim-
ple expropriation or theft. Historically, a chief objective has been to deter
destruction that is undertaken deliberately in order to deny the civilians the
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF fDREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712 (1987).
89. Id. § 712 erne. g.
90. Id. § 712 erne. d.
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use of the property, an objective reflected clearly in the provisions' text.91 In
such situations, all the benefits that flow from property to non-owners are
denied; indeed, denial of those benefits is the very reason that the property
was destroyed in the first place.92
The distinctive character of wartime civilian property protections thus
follows from the distinctive character of the harm to be addressed-the fact
that the destruction of particular civilian property is perceived as affirma-
tively desirable by an opposing army. This goal distinguishes international
humanitarian law's protections of property from both domestic peacetime
protections and peacetime property protection in international law.
Given the tactical temptation to inflict harm on civilians, the deprivation
suffered by civilians must be factored into the damages equation. Disregard-
ing this central factor means ignoring the incentives that actually motivate
actors in the field to take the unlawful actions that they do. If belligerents
were required only to repair or replace civilian property that they deliber-
ately destroyed, they would effectively retain whatever gains they got from
compromising the well-being of civilians, and international humanitarian
law would fail at its object of deterring such unlawful conduct.
In a perfectly functioning, peacetime market, one expects that replace-
ment costs would be roughly equal to the amount of harm inflicted. Indeed,
economically speaking, if a facility could be repaired or replaced for less than
the cost of not having the facility available for civilian use, then one would
expect repair or replacement to be prompt. Thus, it might be argued, there
will be few instances in which extensive and continuous civilian injury will
be experienced, and the cases that do exist will be those where it is simply
economically unjustifiable to perform the repairs because the cost of repair is
greater than the benefit to civilians.
This reasoning does not apply in wartime conditions, however. Because of
general insecurity or even hostile occupation, it may be impossible to reach a
91. Article 54 of Protocol I focuses on the underlying motive of attacks against indispensable objects:
"It is prohibited ro attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock,
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works,for the Jpecifir purpOJe ofdenying them for their
JUJtenanre value to the (jvilian population or to the adverJe Party, whatever the motive, whether in order ro
starve out civilians, to cause them ro move away, or for any other motive." Protocol I, Jupra note 5, art.
54 (emphasis added).
92. The following chare may help summarize and explain the distinctions:
Expropriation of Properry Deliberate Destruction of Properry
Peacetime Closest analogy to domestic takings sce- Compensation to owners should suffice
nario. JUSt compensation due ro owners. to measure harm done. Assumption that
civilian population not put at risk.
War Seizure is allowed by military cusrom Civilian users at risk-likely ro be
and areicle 53 of the Foureh Geneva objects of arrack, and least able to sup-
Convention. pore themselves because resources are
scarce.
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water supply facility for repairs, to replace destroyed food stores, or to re-
build a hospital. Restoring the status quo takes time; water treatment plants
and hospitals take time to build; livestock can be replaced but only over a
period of years. A hostile army destroys these facilities knowing the diffi-
culty of replacing them in the short run under wartime conditions. Indeed,
the precise reason for the desttuction is to impose such costs at a time when
repair or replacement will be nearly impossible.
Under such circumstances it is pointless to argue over the efficiency of
replacing or rebuilding immediately. True, where the imposition on civil-
ians from the destruction is great, and greater than the cost of replacement
or repair, it would be reasonable to mitigate the damages to civilians by
acting quickly. Where the government does not act quickly, one might ar-
gue that this shows that the cost for civilians is not so high as to warrant
recovery under a civilian-use theory. History shows, however, that this rea-
soning is unrealistic. War is not the ideal situation for making these kinds
of efficiency or incentive arguments.
B. The Property Protected by a Civilian-Use Model
The next issue we address is exactly what kinds of property should be
compensated according to a civilian-use model. Not all property that may be
deliberately destroyed is equal in the eyes of international humanitarian law.
The destruction of a bowling alley does not threaten civilian survival like
the destruction of a hospital. Domestic property compensation law does not
require differentiation between different items of property that have the
same market value; if they cost the same to build or rebuild, the measure of
compensation for bowling alleys and for hospitals is the same. However, the
civilian-use model invites-indeed, requires--a way of distinguishing prop-
erty according to its use value.
We begin by turning to article 54 of Protocol I, which recognizes an
implicit distinction in providing "heightened protections" for "objects in-
dispensable to the survival of the civilian population."93 As the Commentary
notes, this article was written to give "special protection for objects of this
nature ... [and} increase the degree of protection,"94 During the drafting of
Protocol I, "indispensable objects" were foremost in the minds of both the
ICRC and the participating states. Article 54 supplies a preliminary list:
"foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, live-
stock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works ... ,"9'
Any property deemed "indispensable" under article 54 should therefore
qualify per se for civilian-use damages.
93. Protocol I, 1Upra note 5, arr. 54.
94. COMMENTARY: DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 80, at 62 (emphasis added).
95. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 54; see a/so supra Part II.C.
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At the other end of the spectrum are luxury items such as jewelry, televi-
sions, or movie theaters; these would be excluded from civilian-use dam-
ages.96 The more difficult cases (as always) are in the middle.
Transporration, for insrance, has characteristics of both luxury and survival.
Planes may be used for tourism, bur also for bringing in essential food sup-
plies or transporting civilians to hospitals. Shops or markets can be essential
to the distribution of food and medicines, bur it would go too far to say that
every place of commerce is essential to civilian well-being.
Here, the Commentary to Protocol I supplies a useful interpretive guide.
The Commentary takes a broad approach to "indispensability," construing
the term in a flexible, context-dependent way. It specifies that the list of
indispensable items in the text of the arricle should be "interpreted in the
widest sense, in order to cover the ... needs of populations in all geographi-
cal areas. "97 The test varies from climate to climate, and from population to
population. As an obvious example, in an arctic climate, warm clothing or
fuel would count as indispensable. In Saharan Africa, trees that provide fruit
and shade might be indispensable, where they would not be in other places.
Also, hospitals are not included in the enumerated list in article 54, bur
should be deemed "indispensable" and qualify for the civilian-use model on
the grounds that they are given such extensive protection elsewhere in the
Conventions.98 Other parricular cases will have to be decided on a case-by-
case basis depending on the kind of properry involved and the surrounding
circumstances.
C. Applying a Civilian-Use Model
Notwithstanding the conceptual reasons for focusing on civilian use, the
inherent complexity of application gives pause. Where remedies are de-
signed to compensate an owner, quantification of damages is a relatively
straightforward matter, at least in comparison to the calculation of remedies
for civilian use. The reasons that civilian use is difficult to measure are va-
96. The differenr rypes of property protections might be diagramed as follows:
Expropriation of Properry Deliberate Destruction of Properry
Peace Closest analogy to domesric Compensation to owners should suffice. Assumption that
takings scenario. JUSt com- civilian users not puc at risk.
pensation due to owners.
War Seizure is allowed by mili- Owner Protection Only Civilian-Use Protection
tary custom and article 53 Luxuries or other objects For "intlispensable
of the Fourth Geneva Con- not indispensable for sur- objects"; extra deterrence
vention. vival; no extra deterrence appropriate to prevenr
necessary. attacks intended to harm
civilians by destroying
their resources.
97. COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOLS, supra note 70, at 655.
98. See, e.g., Fourth Geneva Convenrion, supra note 4, art. 18 (protecting hospitals); Protocol I, supra
note 5, arc. 22 (protecting "hospital ships").
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ried: the number of users is likely to be large and diffuse for any essential
facility; the harm may be potential rather than actual; and the damage that
even a single user suffers is likely to be subjective and difficult to value.
Compensation for property ownership can (admittedly with difficulty) be
gauged by reference to market value, but there is no clear market compari-
son for public services in times of war.
A paradigmatic example, the deliberate destruction of a civilian hospital,
illustrates these difficulties. How many people are affected by such an act?
Should damages calculations include only the harm to civilians who actually
needed to use the hospital while it was not operational, or should it also
include civilians who would have availed themselves of preventative care
(e.g., check-ups)? Or should it include all civilians in the given area, since
they had to live with the knowledge that they had no access to medical care
even in the case of an emergency? If potential harm is to be compensated,
then how does one place a value on damage of this type?
While compensation would clearly be due to persons who can document
specific injuries (e.g., permanent disability or death because of the unavaila-
bility of medical care specifically needed), such a measure, if exclusive,
would systematically underestimate the damage suffered by the population
as a whole. A belligerent that destroys necessary civilian infrastructure in-
tends the scope of the damage to extend to a large group of people, if not the
entire population. For this reason, we believe that a civilian-use model
should be applied by first awarding replacement costs, then also including a
fixed-sum amount for every individual in a given catchment area.
A "catchment area" is a bounded geographic region with a known popu-
lation. Catchment areas can be defined in terms of each piece of civilian
infrastructure. For example, for a particular medical center, a catchment area
may be as large as an entire city, or as small as a few square blocks. In a
developing country, where infrastructure is sparse and heavily utilized, a
single hospital or clinic might serve an entire geographical sub-region.
A fixed-sum award is a relatively small monetary amount applied even-
handedly on the basis of the population of the catchment area.99 A fixed-sum
amount is always somewhat arbitrary, but the precise amount can be tailored
given the severity of the harm suffered in the catchment area. If an occupy-
ing force destroys hospitals, foodstuffs, and water wells at the same time, the
fixed sum could be set at a higher amount than if the destruction pertained
to only one of those essential services.
99. The use of fixed-sum damages to calculate individual damages does not necessarily entail that
money will be paid out to individual claimants. The policy reasons underlying the use of fixed-sum
amounts are equally compelling regardless of whether the fixed sum is used to calculate the amount due
to individual victims, or the amount due to a government that has espoused the individual claims.
Whether or not the srate passes on the award to individuals is a separate question ftom how the damage
is calculated.
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Three important principles suggest using this approach, First, when in-
dispensable objects are deliberately destroyed, a very sizable percentage of
the civilian population in a given catchment area will be affected, In regard
to food and water, it is clear that everyone in the local population needs a
daily ration or else they will die. Hospitals at first blush present a somewhat
more attenuated case, because not everyone uses hospitals every day, or even
every year. Yet the pervasive use of medical facilities should not be dis-
counted. Even in the United States, where hospitals account for a much
smaller percentage of doctor visits, there are roughly 39 emergency room
visits per year per 100 people. lOo This figure counts only visits to the emer-
gency room, not visits to hospital doctors, scheduled check-ups, or our-pa-
tient services. It seems reasonable to assume that in countries where health
maintenance organizations ("HMOs") and individual doctor offices are less
common, as in the developing world, a higher proportion of all available
medical treatment will be provided by hospitals and that 39 percent is a low
estimate of civilian use. Thus, even though hospital use is not as daily as the
consumption of food and water, there is a reasonable inference that a large
percentage of a population may be affected.
The second principle is that every civilian-even those who would not
have used the hospital while it was destroyed-suffers to some extent, Civil-
ians who would not have used the hospital themselves may have had to care
for friends or family who could not get to a hospital. They may have lost
such friends or family. Moreover, the potential to suffer-knowing that if
you get sick there is no recourse to medical care-is so imminent that it
itself is a harm, akin to intentional infliction of emotional distress. 101 As a
practical matter, it may be sufficient to cause the local population to leave
their homes and flee to an unaffected area. Especially in the context of delib-
erate attacks on civilian infrastrucrure, it is very unlikely that any individual
resident in a narrowly defined catchment area went unharmed.
Third, and perhaps obviously, is the cost of individualized assessment.
Trying to collect individual reports will be prohibitively expensive, take an
exceedingly long amount of time, and may be beyond the limited powers of
most commissions or tribunals. By contrast, defining a catchment area and
setting a fixed sum can be done relatively inexpensively and quickly.
It is not unprecedented in international law to rely on a presumption that
everyone in a given catchment has been affected by deliberate destruction.
Such presumptions have been used before in international claims practice-
never with populations as a whole, bur with very large numbers of POWs or
100. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Visits to the Emer-
gency Department Increase Nationwide (Apr. 22, 2002), available at http://www.cdc.govINCHS/press-
room/02news/emergency.htm.
101. As set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torrs § 46, "[o}ne who by extreme and outrageous
conduce intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for
such emotional distress ...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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civilian internees. For instance, after World War II, the Canadian War
Claims Commission granted reparations to Japanese citizens who were in-
terned in camps and mistreated. Rather than require each internee to prove
mistreatment, the Commission "granted a universal per diem award to both
military and civilian Japanese internees on the ground that the treatment
accorded to them ... was so barbarous and inhumane as to make it unneces-
sary to prove it in every case."102 Similarly, the U.S. War Claims Commis-
sion made a presumption with regard to claims by American POWs for
mistreatment at the hands of Germany, Italy, and Japan during World War
11. 103 This Commission did not require American POWs to actually show
mistreatment. Rather, on the basis of its own investigation into the abuses,
it presumed that Germany and Italy violated Geneva Convention obliga-
tions with respect to food rations for all POWs, and that Japan violated
Geneva Convention obligations with respect to forced labor for all POWs.
These post-World War II commissions were able to employ such presump-
tions because the mistreatment in question occurred in very confined spaces,
such as an intern and POW camp, among a defined group.
Here, proving the scope of a catchment area outside the context of a
POW or intern camp may be more difficult, but it is not prohibitively so.
Evidence of the size of a catchment area might include census statistics,
hospital records showing the usual scope of visitors to the hospital, or affida-
vit evidence by doctors or hospital administrators. How broad the catch-
ment area should be in a given case will ultimately be decided on a case-by-
case basis, by consideration of evidence submitted by the injured state. Ac-
curately defining a catchment area and using that figure as the basis of the
damage award will yield more consistent, less expensive, and arguably more
equitable results than trying to determine individualized harm.
IV. THE CIVILiAN-USE MODEL AND THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF REMEDIES
In this Part, we argue that the civilian-use model, while conceptually
somewhat novel, fits squarely within current practices and case law on reme-
dies in international law. It is, from one perspective, a simple corollary of
the existing provision for consequential damages. Where the damage to ci-
vilians was deliberately inflicted, the usual requirement of proximate cause
is automatically satisfied. Moreover, we argue that it poses no threat of vio-
lating international law's prohibitions on double recovery or punitive dam-
ages. That is to say that there is no doctrinal bar to recognizing the need for
compensation for civilian users.
102. George T. Yaces III, State Responsibility for Nonwealth Injures to Aliens in the Postwar Era, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY TO ALIENS 213, 244 (R. Lillich ed., 1983).
103. Id. ac 250-52.
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A. Sources of the International Law of Remedies
Since at least the end of the eighteenth century, 104 international courts
have assumed wide latitude in granting appropriate remedies, even in the
absence of specific provisions in a treaty or convention. 105 The most impor-
tant formulation of this rule came from the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice ("PCI)") in its famous Factory at Chorzrfw decision in 1927:
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Repara-
tion therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a
convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the conven-
tion itself. 106
The PCIJ deduced this principle from the concept of inherent judicial au-
thority, as well as the common law maxim of ubi ius ibi remedium (where
there is a right, there is also a remedy).107 Ian Brownlie has written that the
104. International courtS have been around for much longer of course. As far back as the fourth
century B.C., the Greek Amphictyonic Council acted as an arbiter of territorial dispures between Greek
city states. See COLEMAN PHILUPSON, Two STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (908). In 1603, Henry
IV of France had his ministers draw up plans for a permanent council of Europe. Id Bur the modern font
of the international law on reparations is the Jay Treaty of 1794, signed by the United States and Britain.
The Jay Treaty eStablished arbitral tribunals called "Mixed Commissions" to adjudicate U.S. claims that
the British Navy violated the law of neutrality by illegally seizing over 250 U.S. vessels in the Caribbean
in the early 1790s. The arbiters cite foundational texts in international law-Grotius, Pufendorf, and
Varrel-for different legal propositions on reparations, assuming that, just as the law of nations included
certain substantive rules, so too did it encompass rules on remedies. See Joseph M. Fewster, The]ay Treaty
and British Ship Seizures: The Martinique Cases, 1988 WM. & MARY Q. 426 (988); see also CHRISTINE
GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (987); INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS, MOD-
ERN SERIES 4 (John Basset Moore ed., 1931).
105. The most exhaustive compilation of international awards remains MARJORIE WHITEMAN, DAM-
AGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (937). Whiteman's work was the culmination of an important wave of
scholarly interest in reparations that followed the Treaty of Versailles. See, e.g., ). PERSONNAZ, LA REPA-
RATION DU PREJUDICE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (939); LADISLAS REITZER, LA REPARATION
COMME CONSEQUENCE DE L'ACTE ILLICITE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL (938). Important modern works
include GRAY, supra note 104, and IAN BROWNLIE, 1 SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSI-
BILITY (983). Other modern srudies focus on remedies in discrete subject areas of inrernationallaw. See,
e.g., XUE HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) (international environ-
mental law); NINA H.B. Jl2lRGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
(2000) (international criminal law); DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAw (2d ed. 2005).
106. Facrory at Chorz6w (Jurisdiction) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.c.I.). (ser. A) No.8, at 21 (July 26).
107. The principle was first articulated in Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703) ("If the
plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means ro vindicate and maintain it, and a temedy if he is
injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is a vain thing ro imagine a right withour a
remedy; for ... want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal."). Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the fundamental nature of a tight to a remedy in Marbury v. Madison,S U.S. (l Cranch) 137,
163 (803) ("It is a general and indispurable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.... {F]or it is a setrled and invariable
principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury
its proper redress." (quoting WILUAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *23, *109».
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presumed power of the International Court of Justice ("IC)") to award dam-
ages has gone largely unquestioned. lOB
Traditionally, the ideal form of reparation has been restitutio in integrum, or
restitution. 109 As the PCIJ elaborated in Factory at Chorztfw, "reparation
must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that
act had not been committed."11O When restitution is not available-as will
usually be the case-compensation is the next best alternative. I II Because
"money is the common measure of valuable things,"112 monetary damages
are "perhaps the most commonly sought [form of reparation} in interna-
tional practice,"113 but other kinds of compensation are also available. 114
Historically, reparations have been awarded in a somewhat haphazard
manner. 115 As a leading scholar has pointed out, "international tribunals
have not referred to each other's decisions nor have they developed their own
coherent systems of tules on remedies . . . [remedies are} often merely an
afterthought."116 Instead of looking to international precedent, tribunals
108. Ian Brownlie, Remedies in the International Court 0/Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 557, 558 (V. Lowe & M. Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
109. See, e.g., SHELTON, supra note 105, at 65; Clyde Eagleron, Measure 0/ Damages in International Law,
39 YALE L.]. 52,53 (1929).
llO. Facrory at Chorz6w (Merits) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.!.;' (ser. A) No. 17, ar 47 (Sept. 13).
III. The IC] has held in GabCfkovo-Nagymaros Project, "Ie is a well-established rule of international
law that an injured State is enticled ro obtain compensation from the State which has committed an
internationally wrongful ace for the damage caused by it." Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovakia), 1997 I.e.;. 81 (Sept. 25); see also UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND
COMMENTARIES 218-30 Oames Crawford ed., 2002) [hereinafter Crawford]; if. Legal Consequences of the
Construceion of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terricory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.e.;. 198 Ouly
9).
112. Eaglecon, supra note 109, at 53 (quoting HuGO GROTIUS, DECISIONS AND OPINIONS 19 (1925».
113. See Crawford, supra note lll, at 218.
114. In its 2006 resolution, "Basic Principles on the Right co a Remedy," the U.N. General Assem-
bly highlighted the importance of "rehabilitation" (medical and psychological care), "satisfaction" (a
catch-all that encompasses apologies, memorials, and discovery of the truth), and "guarantees of non-
repetition" (pcomoting mechanisms ro keep the peace). See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right
co a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 147, ~~ 21-23, U.N. Doc. A/RES/601
147 (Mar. 21, 2006); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition a/Victims' Rights, 6 HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 203 (2006). Just last year, the ICJ determined that satisfaction in the form of public condemna-
tion, and not compensation, was the appropriate remedy for Serbia's failure co prevent or punish the
genocide at Srebrenica. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bo5O. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/91/13685.pdf.
115. One cause of the haphazard application is that tribunals deciding these cases have been moscly ad
hoc, and parcicularly susceptible to political considerations. Thus, reparations in the form of monetary
payments have often been over-exacted by more powerful or viccorious nations but have been unrealistic
in cases brought by conquered or weaker states. See F.S. NORTHEDGE & M.D. DoNELAN, INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES: THE POLITICAL ASPECTS (1971); see also F.S. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS: A STUDY
IN THE ApPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 186 (1932) ("The fixing of damages in such cases seems at
boccom ro be largely prophylactic in nature:').
116. Christine Gray, Is There an International Law 0/ Remedies? 65 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 25, 46-47
(1985).
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have sometimes crafted remedies on the basis of municipal laws,117 "general
principles of law,"118 or "inherent judicial authority,"119 or even sometimes
on the basis of all of these together. 120
A cute for this haphazard approach may soon be coming. In 2001, the
International Law Commission completed its work on the Articles on Re-
sponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts ("ILC Articles").l2l
The ILC Articles, which were over fifty years in the making,122 are essen-
tially a restatement of the law of state responsibility prepared for the United
Nations by leading scholars of international law. As former Special Rap-
porteur James Crawford puts it, "{T}he key idea is that a breach of a pri-
mary obligation {a treaty or convention} gives rise, immediately by
operation of the law of state responsibility, to a secondary obligation or se-
ries of such obligations (cessation, reparation ... )."123 Or, as Professor
Caron puts it, the ILC Articles are "trans-substantive rules" that operate to
guide remedies independently of the particular international obligation in
117. id.
118. See, e.g., LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.e.). 466, ~ 48 (June 27) ("Where jurisdiction exisrs over
a dispute on a particular marrer, no separate basis for jurisdiction is required by the Court to consider the
remedies a party has requested for the breach of the obligation. ") (citing Factory at Chorz6w (Jurisdic-
tion) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.e.I.). (ser. A) No.8, at 22 (July 26».
119. See, e.g., Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7, ~ 27, at 49 (July
21, 1989) (applying principles of equity to determine indemnification for non-monetary harm).
120. The Iran-United Scaces Claims Tribunal is a good example of a mixed, Ot hecetogeneous, ap-
proach to damages. See SHELTON, supra noce 105, at 75-77.
121. Crawford, supra note Ill. The ILC Articles were adopted by the International Law Commission
on Augusc 9, 2001 and included in Resolution 56/83 adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on January
28, 2002. Responsibility of Staces for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, U.N.
Doc. AlRes/56/83/Annex (Jan. 28, 2002). The ILC Articles have not yet been enshrined in an interna-
tional convention, but could be soon. See generally James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Continuing
Debate on a UN Convention on State Responsibility, 54 INT'L & COMPo 1.Q. 959 (2005). They have already
been ciced wich approval numerous times by the International Court of Jusrice. See, e.g., Legal Conse-
quences of che Construction of a Wall in che Occupied Palescinian Territory; Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.e.). 198 (July 9).
122. The process began in 1955, with F.V. Garcia-Amador as Special Rapporceur. Garcia-Amador
rued that decisions by international tribunals on remedies had been "individual, and at times capri-
cious." F.V. Garcia-Amador, Report on Responsibility of the State for injuries Caused in its Territory to the
Person or Property of Aliens-Reparations of the injury, [1%1] 2 Y.B. INT'L 1. COMM'N 1, 7. He also later
wrote thac no "principles, criteria or methods [exist] for determining a priori how reparacion is to be
made for che injury caused by a wrongful act or omission." F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR ET AL., RECENT
CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBIUTY foR INJURIES TO AuENS 89 (974). In 1987,
Chriscine Gray suggested abandoning rhe process altOgether:
Rather than follow this approach [in evolving a sec of general rules applicable in all cases], it
would be better [for international tribunals] to accepc the present lack of uniformiry, and
eicher rurn to a particular municipal system (rather than general principles of law) for gui-
dance, or accept that a case-by-case approach to decisions on the basis of che relacionship
between the parties may be inevitable.
Gray, supra note 116, at 46-47. Yet the ILC persevered and completed che Draft Articles in 2001.
123. James Crawford, The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally Wrongful Acts: A
Retrospect, 96 AM. ). INT'L 1. 874, 876 (2002).
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question. 124 The liC Articles will provide a common platform from which
international tribunals going forward will approach questions of remedies.
In large part through the systemization provided by the liC Articles,
there is now general acceptance of certain basic principles of the interna-
tional law of remedies. Among the principles that are relevant to imple-
menting a civilian-use model, and accordingly the ones we discuss below,
are the requirement that the wrongful act be the proximate cause of the
damage for which compensation is sought, the prohibition on double recov-
ery, and the prohibition on punitive damages. We argue below that none of
these traditional principles is violated by awarding recovery for loss of civil-
ian use.
B. Consequential Damages and the Proximate Cause Requirement
The major question faced by a civilian-use model is when destruction of
civilian property will be sufficiently proximate to the harms suffered by in-
dividual civilians. Under international law, the doctrine of proximate cause
limits responsibility for harms that are "too indirect, remote, and uncertain
••••"125 The proximate cause requirement is particularly important where,
as here, the damages sought can be conceptualized as one form of conse-
quential damage. The injury to civilian users is a consequence of the interna-
tionally unlawful conduct of one of the belligerents, only slightly less direct
a consequence than the injury to the owners.
The proximate-cause requirement sometimes makes it difficult to attri-
bute second-order effects to primary violations. Especially in the context of
international war, there will be many potential preceding, superseding, or
intervening causes. Are civilians' deaths from a difficult childbirth or from
malaria attributable to the fact that a local hospital was destroyed? Would
deaths from malnutrition have taken place if grain stores had not been set on
fire or livestock gratuitously killed? Particularly in the application of the
catchment area approach suggested above, which does not require claimants
to show individualized proof of harm, the proximate cause requirement
presents a serious concern. However, the requirement of proximate cause is
significantly less problematic if civilian-use recovery is limited to cases in
which an enemy state deliberately destroys civilian infrastructure. If it can be
shown, or at least inferred, that an occupying power intended to destroy a
hospital, then it is more narural to attribute consequential harms to the actus
reus of the enemy state.
124. David D. Caron, The ILC's Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship Between F017ll
and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT'L 1. 857, 871 (2002).
125. Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision, 33 AM. J. INT'L 1. 182, 206 (939); see also Mark A.
Drumbl, Trail Smelter and the International Law Commission's Work on State Responsibility for Internationally
Wrongful Acts and State Liability, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM
THE ThAlL SMELTER ARBITRATION 85 (R.M. Bratspies & R.A. Miller eds., 2006).
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Where harm is intentional, it is necessarily reasonably foreseeable, and
foreseeability is generally sufficient to satisfy the requirement of proximate
cause. 126 Under international law, as in domestic law, foreseeability and
proximate cause have been closely linked for both conceptual and practical
reasons. Foreseeability is important as a convenient shorthand for the natural
or probable consequences of any act. The natural or probable consequences of
an action are usually "those which human foresight can anticipate because
they happen so frequently they may be expected to recur," as contrasted
with remote consequences, which "are those which happen so infrequently
that they are not expected ro happen ...."127 As one academic notes, "[a}
review of cases decided by international claims commissions in this century
shows that tribunals have often inquired whether the losses were reasonably
foreseeable." 128 Since there is currently no universal, objective test for proxi-
mate cause, foreseeability has served as a useful guidepost. 129
Courts and academics have sometimes analogized proximate cause to an
elastic band-the band can be stretched to find liability the more unjusti-
fied or terrible the original action. 130 Deterrence supplies the rationale for
doing so. For example, in the Angola (or Naulilaa) case,131 an international
tribunal held that Germany's unjustified military incursion into Angola
proximately caused a popular uprising, for which Germany was therefore
126. Most tecently, for example, the U.N. Compensation Commission has tethered its proximate
cause analysis ro foreseeability. See generally Arrhur W. Rovine & Grant Hanessian, Toward a Fomeeability
Approach to CaUJation QUeItions at the United Nations Compensation Commission, in THE UNITED NATIONS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 235.
127. Rowell v. Wichita, 176 P.2d 590, 596 (Kan. 1947).
128. Rovine & Hanessian, supra nOte 126, at 244; see also GRAY, supra nOte 104, at 24 ("Probably it is
not possible ro make any statement more precise than that the degree of fault of the respondent state will
influence the arbitrarot in his calculations. "). The UNCC has allowed consequential damages that were
the foteseeable results of intentional illegal acts, and it has done so even though its founding document-
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687-holds Iraq liable only for "direct loss, damage ... or injury."
S.c. Res. 687, ~ 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). For instance, a panel concluded that claims
for serious personal injury caused by pollution emitted from Kuwaiti oil wells were compensable. The
claimants prevailed because the burning of Kuwaiti oil wells by the Iraqi army had been intentional,
premeditated, and systematic. Since the destruction of the wells was intentional, it was foreseeable that
civilians would suffer from pollution damage. See U.N. Sec. Council, U.N. Compo Comm'n Governing
Council, Recommendations Made by the Panel ofCommissioners Concerning Individual Claims for Serious Personal
Injury or Death (Category "8" Claims), III(B)(2)(c), U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1994/1 (May 26, 1994).
129. There has been much doctrinal debate in the United States over whether foreseeability is more
properly viewed as an element of duty, rather than as a part of causation. See, e.g., Dellwo v. Pearson, 107
N.W.2d 859, 862 (Minn. 1961) (holding that foreseeability was not an element of proximate cause
because "negligence is tesred by foresight but proximate cause is determined by hindsight"). But in
practice foreseeability has always been used to measure both duty and causation. As the Restatement
(Third) of Torrs notes: "CourtS have increasingly moved toward adopting a foreseeability test for scope of
liability in negligence cases. Currently, virtually all jutisdictions employ a foreseeability (or risk) Stan-
dard for some range of scope-of-liability issues." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABIUTY FOR PHYSI-
CAL HARM § 29 cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,2005).
130. Rovine & Hanessian, supra note 126, at 236.
131. ReIponsabilitt de /'Allemagne araison des dommages caus{s dans leI colonies portugaim du sud de /'Afrique
(Port. V. Ger.) [Liability of Germany for Damages Caused in the Porruguese Colonies in the South of
Africa), 2 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS lOll (1928).
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liable. The tribunal noted that the uprising was a foreseeable, and perhaps
even an intended, consequence of the illegal incursion. 132
In the subset of cases where the consequences of an act are not only fore-
seeable, but also intended, domestic courtS have not hesitated to find proxi-
mate causation no matter how remote the causal chain. 133 Courts in the
United States and Britain have adopted the adage that "intended conse-
quences cannot be too remote."134 H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore explain in
their encyclopedic study Causation in the Law that if human agents intend to
cause certain consequences, the causal chain between their actions and the
intended consequences should extend through whatever circuitous events
come between them. 135 Hart and Honore conclude, "We do not hesitate to
trace the cause back through even very abnormal occurrences if the sequence
is deliberately produced by some human agent."136 No international cases
directly support this proposition, bur it has been approved in dicta. 137
Without going quite as far as Hart and Honore's conclusion that for-
seeability is necessarily sufficient, the liC Articles recognize deliberate in-
tent to cause an injury as one factor in establishing proximate cause. The
liC Commentary to article 31 explains that
[c)ausality in fact is a necessary bur not a sufficient condition for repa-
ration. There is a further element, associated with the exclusion of in-
jury that is too "remote" or "consequential" to be the subject of
reparation. In some cases, the criterion of "directness" may be used, in
others "foreseeability" or "proximity." But other factors may also be
132. [d. at 1031 ("[l}ndeed, it would not be equitable to let the injured party bear those losses which
the author of the initial illegal act has foreseen and perhaps even intended for the sole reason that, in the
chain of causation, there ate some intermediate links.") (translation by authors).
133. "An actor who intentionally or recklessly causes physical harm is subject to liability for a broader
range of harms than rhe harms for which that actor would be liable if only acting negligently." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABIUTY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, supra note 129, § 33(b).
134. Akins v. State, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 531, 566 (Ct. App. 1996).
135. H.L.A. HART & ToNY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 43 (2d ed. 1985). Hart and Honore
provide a helpful example:
The cause of a motor accident may be rhe icy condition of the road, but it would be odd to cire
the cold as a cause of the accident. By contrast ... if I take advantage of the exceptional cold




137. J. RALSTON, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF 1903, at 7, 9 (904) (citing Dix Case (U.S. v.
Venez.),9 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 119(903». In rhe Case of Ford Dix, a mixed commission did not find
proximate cause, but would have, had the claimant been able to prove an intent to harm him. The case
was brought after the Venezuelan army seized cattle belonging to an American citizen, and rhe American
sold the remainder of his cattle at a significant loss. The American argued that he deserved compensation
for the losses incurred by selling his cattle at below market price. But the commission refused to make
such an award, in the absence of any evidence of the Venezuelan army's intent to harm him, or to seize
his remaining cattle: "Governments like individuals are responsible only for the proximare and natural
consequences of their acts. International as well as municipal law denies compensation for remote conse-
quences in the absence of evidence of deliberate intention to injure." [d.
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relevant: for example, whether State organs deliberately caused the
harm in question, or whether the harm caused was within the ambit of
the rule which was breached, having regard to the purpose of that rule.
In other words, the requirement of a causal link is not necessarily the
same in relation to every breach of an international obligation. In inter-
national as in national law, the question of remoteness of damage "is
not a part of the law which can be satisfactorily solved by search for a
single verbal formula."138
Thus, for the purposes of the civilian-use model, the analysis suggested by
the liC Articles should allow claims when the injuries arise from the inten-
tional, deliberate destruction of civilian property. When civilian property is
intentionally destroyed, the two "plus factors" in the liC formulation are
both present: the action is deliberate, and the harm caused is "within the
ambit of the rule which was breached."139
In the end, proximate cause will always require an ad hoc, case-by-case
inquiry into the sufficiency of the relationship between two events, as well
as mixed considerations of logic, common sense, and politics. 140 Bur when
an army intentionally destroys a civilian hospital, a range of harms are fore-
seeable, including that pregnant women may die in childbirth, or that chil-
dren will not receive vaccines and be more susceptible to hepatitis.
Proximate cause should not act as a bar to recovery in all cases.
C. Double Recovery and Punitive Damages
Another concern with civilian-use damages is that international law al-
lows only one recovery of damages for each wrong or injury suffered. Both
"double recovery" and "punitive damages" are prohibited. Under the PCI)'s
Factory at ChorzOw decision141 and article 47 of the liC Articles,142 the only
accepted purpose for exacting reparations from a state that has breached its
international obligations is restoration of the injured parties to the situation
in which they would have been, absent the breach.
At first appearance, civilian-use damages might seem to be punitive, or
represent double recovery, since the compensation paid would surpass the
138. Crawford, supra note 111, at 204-05.
139. Id. at 204. Clearly, preventing effects such as starvation or lack of access to medicine was within
the ambit of the Geneva Conventions. See supra Part II.
140. See generally D. E. Buckner, Annotation, Foreseeability as an Element of Negligence and Proximate
Cause, 100 A.L.R. 2d 942 (1965). The most famous description of proximate cause as policy analysis
comes from Judge Andrews, in his famous dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.:
A murder in Sarajevo may be the necessary antecedent to an assassination in London twenry
years hence ... {but] because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the
law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is
practical politics.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews,)., dissenting).
141. Factory at Chorz6w (Metits) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.c.I.). (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13).
142. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 111, at 44, 70-71.
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replacement cosr of the desrroyed property. This appearance is misleading.
The compensarion is for twO separate harms to two distinct legal interests:
the owner's interest in the property and the civilians' reliance on that
property.
The prohibition on "double recovery" is concerned with multiple pay-
ments for the identical injury; it prevents one claimant from recovering from
two different sources for the same loss, in such a way as to create a wind-
fall. 143 Faced with situations where individuals had submitted the same
claims against Iraq both to itself and to a domestic court, for example, the
UNCC had to pay "constant attention" to ensure that the same person was
not compensated twice. 144 Civilian-use damages, by contrast, compensate
two different interests, the owner's and the civilian users'. The owner of any
infrastrucrure has a property right in that infrastructure, and, under the ap-
plicable articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I, civilians
who use infrastructure have a distinct and compensable interest in addition.
Neither should civilian-use damages be considered "punitive dam-
ages,"145 which international law, like most civil law systems, does not al-
IOW. 146 Civilian-use damages are not intended to punish the violator, but
rather to compensate victims. The fact that civilian-use compensation is
measured differently from expropriation damages, in order to take account
of the consequences to civilians and not merely the property owner, does not
mean that it is punitive. Valuing property at a heightened level does not
violate the prohibition, nor does taking into account the fact that the harm
being compensated was caused deliberately.147
143. The prohibition on double recovery was affirmed, for example, by the PCl) in Factory at ChfJ1"ZOw
(Merits), 1928 P.c.!.). (ser. A) No. 17, at 59, when it held that a remedy sought by Germany could nOt
be granted "or the same compensation would be awarded twice over." See also Crawford, supra note Ill,
at 272-75. For a discussion of double recovery in the United States, see Brightheart v. McKay, 420 F.2d
242 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
144. Alzamora, supra note 12, at 8.
145. Punitive damages-sometimes called "exemplary damages" or "extra-compensatory dam-
ages"-are "sums awarded apart from any compensatory or nominal damages, usually ... because of
particularly aggravated misconduct on the part of the defendant." DAN B. DoBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAw OF REMEDIES 204 (1973) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 (939»; see also Lord SCOtt of
Foscote, Randy). Holland & Chilton Davis Varner, The Role of "Extra-Compensatory" Damages For Viola-
tions of Fundamental Human Rights in the United Kingdom & The United States, 46 VA. ). INT'L 1. 475
(2006). The concept has existed since at least the Code of Hammurabi, which provided that if a person
stole an animal from the temple, that person would have to repay the temple thirtyfold. ALBERT
KOCOUREK & JOHN WlGORE, 1 SoURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW 391 (915).
146. The reasons typically given are that there can be no mala mem, or malice on the part of an
impersonal government, and also that it would be wrong to punish the people of a state for the act of
their government. See Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.7, at 52, ~ 38
Ouly 21, 1989); see also FiIartiga v. Pefia-lrala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Nina H.B.
jllrgensen, A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages in International Law, 68 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L 1. 247 (997); S.
Wittich, Awe of the Gods and Fear of the Priests: Punitive Damages in the Law of State Responsibility, 101
AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L & EUR. 1. 157(998); Adam Liptak, Foreign Courts Wary of u.s. Punitive Damages,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, at Ai, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/26/us/
26punitive.html.
147. As Lord Devlin noted in Rookes v. Barnard:
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V. CONCLUSION
Seeking civilian-use damages may seem quixotic, especially in a world
where very few claims will ever come before a commission. Why should we
concern ourselves with compensation for newly recognized forms of injury
when the international legal system cannot even accommodate compensation
for traditional forms of harm? But the aspirational narure of international
humanitarian law is not limited to the idea of compensation for civilian use;
it is endemic. As one scholar has written, U[i]nevitably, the Geneva Conven.:.
tions were 'our of date' from the moment they entered into force; they laid
our rules for a world more orderly than the world they had inherited, and
hoped that by doing so, they would encourage life to imitate art."148
Civilian-use damages are no more unrealistic than anything else about the
Conventions. Their idealism lies in the simple implication that civilian suf-
fering matters at least as much as costs for bricks and mortar. Never mirid
that over a billion people on this planet live on less than one dollar a day; 149
when the food, water, or medicine people have access to is intentionally
destroyed, civilians should receive compensation, or at the least have their
harm recognized by an international commission. The harms from destruc-
tion of indispensable objects will often be greater to civilians who use the
objects than to owners, especially if there is rio owner, the owner is a corpo-
ration, or the owner is the state.
[COUrtS oftenJ take into account the motives and conduct of the defendant where they aggra-
vate the injury caused to the plaintiff.... Indeed, when one examines the cases in which large
damages have been awarded fot conduct of this sort, it is not at all easy to say whether the idea
of compensation or the idea of punishment has prevailed.
Rookes v. Bernard [I964J A. C. 1129 (H.L. 1964) (appeal taken from Eng.).
148. Rosa Brooks, The Politic> of the Geneva Conventiom: Avoiding Formalist Traps, 46 VA. J. INT'L L.
197, 198 (2005).
149. JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF PoVERTY 20 (2005); Shaohua Chen & Mattin Ravallion, How Have
the World's Poorest Fared Since the Early 1980s? (World Bank Dev. Research Group, Working Paper No.
3341, 2004), available at http://www-wds.wotldbank.org/external/defaultIWDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/
2004/07/22/000112742_20040722172047/Rendered/PDF/wps3341.pdf.
